A note on eternity by De Florio, Ciro & Frigerio, Aldo
1 23
Topoi
An International Review of Philosophy
 
ISSN 0167-7411
 
Topoi
DOI 10.1007/s11245-016-9376-1
A Note on Eternity
Ciro De Florio & Aldo Frigerio
1 23
Your article is protected by copyright and all
rights are held exclusively by Springer Science
+Business Media Dordrecht. This e-offprint
is for personal use only and shall not be self-
archived in electronic repositories. If you wish
to self-archive your article, please use the
accepted manuscript version for posting on
your own website. You may further deposit
the accepted manuscript version in any
repository, provided it is only made publicly
available 12 months after official publication
or later and provided acknowledgement is
given to the original source of publication
and a link is inserted to the published article
on Springer's website. The link must be
accompanied by the following text: "The final
publication is available at link.springer.com”.
A Note on Eternity
Ciro De Florio1 • Aldo Frigerio1
 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016
Abstract The timeless solution to the problem of divine
foreknowledge and human freedom has many advantages.
Still, the relationship between a timeless God and temporal
beings is problematic in a number of ways. In this paper,
we focus on the specific problems the timeless view has to
deal with when certain assumptions on the metaphysics of
time are taken on board. It is shown that on static con-
ception of time God’s omniscience is easily accounted for,
but human freedom is threatened, while a dynamic con-
ception has no problems with human freedom, but, on this
view, some truths seem not to be knowable by a timeless
God. We propose Fragmentalism as a metaphysics of time
in which the divine timeless knowledge of temporal events
and human freedom can be reconciled.
Keywords Divine omniscience  Eternalism 
Fragmentalism  Temporal logic
1 Introduction
Eternity is definitely a very difficult topic. With reference
to (Sellars 1962, p. 527), William Craig writes:
An eminent philosopher has remarked that ‘‘the
problem of time’’ is virtually unrivaled in ‘‘the extent
to which it inexorably brings into play all the major
concerns of philosophy’’. Combine the problem of
time with ‘‘the problem of God,’’ as the study of
divine eternity requires, and you have a subject
matter which would exhaust a lifetime of study.
(Craig 2001, p. iii)
Even confining ourselves only to recent contributes within
the very conspicuous literature on this matter, we can
identify at least three large families of problems. First of
all, there is the problem of distinguishing the ways in
which God and other timeless entities, such as abstract
objects, eternally exist. In which sense is God out of time?
Is He out of time in the same manner in which the number
4 is considered out of time? Note that the questions
discussed in philosophy of mathematics since Benacerraf
(see Benacerraf 1973) share interesting analogies with the
topic of the interaction of a timeless God with temporal and
spatial entities. One of the classical problems Benacerraf
dealt with is how it is possible to characterize mathematical
knowledge—i.e. knowledge of abstract properties and
relations—in a naturalistic framework. Mathematical
objects are abstract, timeless, non-spatial entities and,
therefore, they are causally ineffective. Then, it is not clear
how human beings, that are part of the temporal and spatial
net, can acquire knowledge on the domain in question.
Similarly, on the timeless account of God’s existence, it is
not clear how He can causally interact with spatial and
temporal entities. In fact, the problem of the cross-relations
between God and temporal entities is even more pressing:
while it is possible to paraphrase mathematical language in
order to show that its ontological commitment is actually
less demanding for a naturalist account of knowledge, the
same argumentative move is not available to an advocate
of the timeless view of God.
Another question, which has been discussed for a long
time, concerns the nature of eternity itself. In particular,
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one can inquire how a timeless entity can have a life, that
is, how it can be in states that have a duration. A possible
strategy is to claim that God’s life has a simple extension,
devoid of parts. Another way to answer is by calling into
question the assumption that a personal being cannot have
a punctual life, without any duration.
A third family of problems specifically regards the
relationship between a timeless God and the entities that
exist in time. This paper will look into some of these
problems. In particular, God’s timeless conception will be
compared with some metaphysical accounts of time. The
paper is divided into five sections: in the next section, the
timeless solution to the problem of divine omniscience and
human freedom is reviewed. In Sect. 3 the relationship
between God’s timeless conception and a static meta-
physics of time is analyzed. In Sect. 4 we provide some
attempts to reconcile a genuinely dynamic conception of
time with an atemporal view of God. Finally, Sect. 5
contains our proposal.
2 Timeless Solution to the Dilemma of God’s
Foreknowledge and Human Freedom
The problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom
can be summed up as follows: God is omniscient and,
therefore, He knows today what John will do on 3rd March
2026. In particular, assume that God knows that on 3rd
March 2026 John decides to mow his lawn. Is John free to
decide to mow his lawn or not? If John decided not to mow
his lawn, then God’s present belief would be false and,
thus, He would not be omniscient. But, if John cannot do
but to mow his lawn, he cannot be considered free. God’s
omniscience seems to be a limit to human beings’ freedom.
A possible solution to this problem is to state that God’s
knowledge is not in time. It is inappropriate to say that God
knows something today because God is a timeless entity.
He atemporally ‘‘sees’’ John’s free act exactly as John’s
birth, his death, and every event that makes the world
history. On this view, John can choose to mow his lawn or
not because his choice has no influence on God’s past
beliefs, which do not properly exist.
Some critics of this solution (cf., for instance, Zagzebski
1991) have objected that a fatalist argument can be
mounted also in this case. The idea, in a nutshell, is that if
God timelessly knows that John decides to mow his lawn—
let us call p the proposition describing this state of affairs—
the truth of p is fixed ab aeterno. It is, therefore, not in
John’s power to choose not to mow his lawn, making
:p true. A possible response to this objection (cf. for
example Rogers 2007) is to underline that God knows that
John mows his lawn because John freely chooses to mow
his lawn. Therefore, necessity of p does not undermine the
agent’s freedom. It is the agent herself who, by choosing p,
makes p necessary. Now, since God is eternal, He is co-
present with every time and knows every time as if it were
present; therefore, God knows every action performed by
the agent at every time. Nevertheless, this knowledge does
not clash with the agent’s freedom because it depends on
the agent’s choice. If we see an agent a performing an
action p, then we know that a performs p and that p has a
consequent necessity. Yet, this is not in contrast with a’s
freedom. The same is true for God: He eternally sees every
point in time and thus He sees a performing p at t. So p has
a consequent necessity at t, but neither God’s knowledge
nor the consequent necessity of p are in contrast with
John’s freedom.
The timeless solution appears to be an interesting proposal
to solve the dilemma of divine omniscience and human
freedom. In fact, one of the main reasons to adopt a timeless
conception of God is because it reconciles omniscience with
freedom. However, we will see that this solution has to face
the problem of the metaphysical relationship between an
eternal entity and temporal entities and, in particular, the
relationship between God’s timeless knowledge and the
temporal entities that are known. Under assumptions, these
relationships seem to undermine human freedom.
3 God’s Knowledge and the Static View of Time
The metaphysics of time one is assuming is crucial when
inquiring the relationship between an eternal entity—like
God—and the temporal states of affairs.1 We will distin-
guish below, rather roughly, two very general options
regarding the metaphysics of time: the static (or eternalist)
conception and the dynamic conception.2
The eternalist conception seems to be particularly con-
sonant with the idea of an omniscient and timeless God.
However, the advocates of this conception have to deal
1 Obviously, the assumed metaphysics of time is not relevant when
the intrinsic nature of a timeless God has to be characterized. By
definition, an entity that is outside time is compatible with presentism,
eternalism and the conceptions that are intermediate between these
two (growing block theory, moving spotlight, etc.). It is, of course,
necessary to formulate the different metaphysics of time in such a
way that they do not exclude that something outside time can exist.
For instance, if the main thesis of presentism is: only present entities
exist (cf., for example, Crisp 2003), this axiom should be reformu-
lated as: all that exists in time exists in the present.
2 We prefer not to use the A-theory–B-theory terminology here
because it could be difficult to ascribe some positions to these classes.
Consider, for instance, the moving spotlight theory. According to this
view, all temporal things exist eternally. However, the present has a
privileged ontological status and determines the objective time flow.
This position has some features of both the A-theory (the present is
ontologically privileged and time flows objectively) and the B-theory
(future and past facts exist eternally).
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with one main issue: the fatalist threat. Let us see this point
in detail.
In our discussion we will presuppose a rather shared
principle, the Truthmaker Principle:
(TM) Every truth requires a truthmaker, an existing
state of affairs (or ‘fact’) that necessitates and
thereby grounds its truth.3
God is conceived as out of time and, thus, His knowledge
cannot change and evolve in any way. Now, since God is
omniscient, He knows every truth. For (TM), if God knows p,
then there exists a truthmaker that makes p true. The matter
becomes particularly intriguing when we assume that God
(atemporally) knows the future course of history.4
Let us assume that God eternally knows that John mows
his lawn on 3rd March 2026. Since knowledge is factive, it
is true that John mows his lawn on 3rd March 2026. This
proposition is true, therefore a truthmaker that makes the
proposition true must exist. Under some assumptions, the
truthmaker cannot be a present state of affairs, because at
the present nothing determines John’s future free choice.
John’s future free choice must, in a certain sense, already
exist. The thesis that all facts—past, present, future ones—
exist is usually called ‘‘block universe theory’’. The whole
history of the world is already given and the only temporal
relations are the relations ‘‘earlier than’’, ‘‘simultaneous
with’’, etc. that characterize the B-series. God’s omni-
science and eternity seem to imply a static view of time.
However, it is not clear whether such a view allows for a
libertarian conception of freedom.5 If every choice is
already given, it is not indeterminate today whether John
will perform p or not in the future. If nothing is indeter-
minate, no room seems to be left for libertarian freedom.
A first solution is to accept a compatibilist view of
freedom. On this view, the problem of divine prescience
and human freedom rapidly dissolves. However, here we
would like to investigate the solutions that hold a stronger
conception of freedom, that is the libertarian conception.
4 God’s Knowledge and the Dynamic View
of Time
Only few advocates of the eternalist conception of God are
ready to pay the price of a block universe because such a
view of time seems to undermine a strong conception of
freedom. Consider the two following thesis:
1. God exists in a timeless manner and He has a particular
relationship with the temporal entities.
2. Time flows and the becoming of temporal entities is a
real dimension of being.
In this section we will discuss two significant proposals
that hold these two points: Stump and Kretzmann’s and
Leftow’s positions. We will see, however, that, their merits
notwithstanding, they suffer some problems.
4.1 Simultaneity and Eternity
Stump and Kretzmann believe that time and eternity are
separate ontological dimensions. The eternal events cannot
be temporal and, conversely, the temporal events cannot be
eternal. Since there are two categories of events (temporal
and eternal), there must be two simultaneity relations, one
for the temporal events and the other for the eternal events:
(T) T-simultaneity = existence or occurrence at
one and the same time
(E) E-simultaneity = existence or occurrence at
one and the same eternal present (Stump and
Kretzmann 1981, p. 435)
In order to characterize the relationship between the eternal
God and the temporal world, Stump e Kretzmann postulate a
third type of simultaneity, called ET-simultaneity:
(ET) For every x and for every y, x and y are ET-
simultaneous iff
(1) either x is eternal and y is temporal, or vice
versa; and
(2) for some observer, A, in the unique eternal
reference frame, x and y are both present—i.e.
either x is eternally present and y is observed as
temporally present, or vice versa; and
3 For this formulation, (Rhoda 2009, p. 41). On this topic, we refer,
among others, to Armstrong (2004), Beebee and Dodd (2005), Lowe
and Rami (2009).
4 Admittedly, on the ground of the definition of knowledge and from
that of truthmaking, one could consistently claim that, since today it is
neither true nor false that John will make p tomorrow, there is no
actual truthmaking that makes the proposition true (or its contradic-
tory true). Accordingly, one should affirm that even God does not
know the outcome of John’s decision today, because this is
indeterminate at the present. God will learn tomorrow what John
will decide tomorrow because He will see his decision. However, this
conception requires a temporal God, who changes His beliefs on the
basis of what happens in time.
5 On this point, W.L. Craig notices an interpretative problem in
Thomas Aquinas’ position. Although it is reasonable to believe that
Thomas considered becoming an objective feature of reality and
embraced a dynamic view of time, his doctrine on future contingents
is intelligible only if a tenseless theory of time is assumed: ‘‘[…] The
entire temporal series would seem to exist timelessly, on the analogy
of a spatial extension, and as such is known by God’’ (Craig 1988,
p. 117).
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(3) for some observer, B, in one of the infinitely
many temporal reference frames, x and y are
both present—i.e. either x is observed as
eternally present and y is temporally present, or
vice versa. (Stump and Kretzmann 1981,
p. 439)
The relation of ET-simultaneity is symmetric (if x is ET-
simultaneous with y, then y is ET-simultaneous with x), but
also irreflexive and intransitive. If it were transitive, absurd
conclusions would follow: since time t is ET-simultaneous
with God and God is ET-simultaneous with another time t’,
it would follow that t and t’ are ET-simultaneous.
A possible problem concerns the temporal/eternal exis-
tence of events. Stump and Kretzmann mention the fol-
lowing example. Suppose that in His eternal present God is
simultaneous—ET-simultaneous—with Richard Nixon
when he was alive on 9th August 1974. However, God is
also simultaneous with Richard Nixon at the moment of his
death on 22th April 1994.6 From the point of view of God’s
eternal present, Nixon is both alive and dead, which is
absurd. Stump and Kretzmann respond that:
One and the same eternal present is ET-simultaneous
with Nixon’s being alive and is also ET-simultaneous
with Nixon’s dying; so Nixon’s life is ET-simulta-
neous with and hence present to an eternal entity, and
Nixon’s death is ET-simultaneous with and hence
present to an eternal entity, although Nixon’s life and
Nixon’s death are themselves neither eternal nor
simultaneous (Stump and Kretzmann 1981, p. 443)
Stump and Kretzmann’s view has received numerous
criticisms. It has been claimed that their position is obscure
(Fitzgerald 1985; Helm 2011) or that it introduces a
concept (that of ET-simultaneity) that is entirely ad hoc
and that does not offer any explanation of the metaphysical
relationship between eternity and time (Yates 1990; Helm
2011). However, we do not believe these criticisms to be
appropriate: the ET-simultaneity relation is neither obscure
nor unjustified. The basic idea is that there are two
dimensions—the temporal and eternal dimensions—and
three different kinds of relationships that characterize the
relations among temporal things, those among eternal
things and those between temporal and eternal things. In
fact, no account claiming that God is outside time can
dispense with these three kinds of relationships.7
What seems a more serious difficulty for Stump and
Kretzmann’s position is that the relation of ET-simultane-
ous is completely unanalyzed. In fact, such relation is
substantiated in a different way according to the accepted
metaphysics of time. For example, consider the static
block-universe. Then, ET-simultaneous is a relation
between static and non-dynamical things and can be con-
ceived as stable and a-temporal. Instead, let us assume a
non-dynamic metaphysics of time according to which the
present time is privileged compared to the other times.
Since there is a variable privileged time (the present), how
can God have the same ET-simultaneous relation with
every time? The present is distinct from the other times and
this fact represents an important feature of temporal reality.
How can God have the same identical relationship with the
present time and with the other times? Only two alterna-
tives seem to be open: either we affirm that God does not
know an ontological trait of the world—for instance, the
fact that it is 4 o’clock now—or we affirm that the
dynamicity of time is an illusion. However, both these
alternatives are unpalatable. So, the question is whether it
is possible to reconcile the temporal dynamic with the fact
that God has the same relationship with every time. Since
Stump and Kretzmann do not analyze the ET-simultaneous
relation in any way, these problems remain unsolved.
4.2 Leftow’s Position
Brian Leftow puts forward an alternative solution. His basic
intuition is that the events are, in a way, both temporal and
eternal. Consequently, God, who lives in the eternity, sees
events under the eternal respect while they are temporally
present to us. Leftow characterizes the eternal dimension by
means of an analogy according to which space is to time as
time is to eternity. The analogy is rather articulated (Leftow
2009, pp. 212–213) but we will just focus on a few points: as
all the spatial points co-exist in a unique instant of time, so
all the temporal points co-exist (and, in a sense, are con-
tained) in the eternity. Particularly, just as entities with
spatial features remain so when they exist in time, so entities
with temporal features remain so when they exist in eternity.
Reality is, according to Leftow, structured in an eternal
dimension which includes God and the temporal things that
exist at once. Therefore, God and the world are
6 Richard Nixon died in 1994, after the publication of Stump and
Kretzmann’s paper. We have changed the example in light of this.
7 Stump and Kretzmann’s theory is a more formal version of a
classical way of representing the relationships between temporality
and eternity, which goes back at least to Boethius: that of a circle with
a point in the center. The circle represents the temporal series while
the central point is God’s eternal perspective, which has the same
Footnote 7 continued
relation with every point of the circle. In this representation there are
two kinds of points: those on the circle and that in the center. They
represent the two dimensions: temporality and eternity. The relations
TS and ES are represented by the relations between the things that are
on circle and those that are in the center respectively. The existence of
the radii of the circle justifies the third kind of relationship—the ETS
relation.
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simultaneous in the eternity but nevertheless the world does
not lose its genuine temporal properties.
In order to explain how an event can be both temporally
located and eternally present, Leftow assumes a particular
interpretation of Special Relativity according to which the
concept of simultaneity is relative to a framework. It is
both scientific and philosophical folklore that one of the
consequences of the Special Relativity Theory is the rela-
tivization of the concept of simultaneity between events to
different inertial systems. Leftow’s philosophical intuition
proposes to extend the relativity of simultaneity to the
concept of actuality of the events:
If simultaneity and presentness are relative to refer-
ence frames, then if present events are actual in some
way in which future events are not, this sort of
actuality is itself relative to reference frames. Thus,
there is a (strictly limited) sense in which the rela-
tivity of simultaneity entails a relativity of actuality.
(Leftow 2009, p. 232)
We shall not discuss here the plausibility of this particular
interpretation of the Theory of Special Relativity even if—
obviously—a good deal of philosophical work should be
done in order to show the very possibility of extending to
actuality what it holds for the simultaneity. Robinson sums
up:
[A]lthough all events of all times are present at once
in eternity, it does not follow that all events of all
times are present at once in time or in any temporal
reference frame. Although in eternity time is tense-
less, it does not follow that in time time is tenseless.
(Robinson 1995, p. 133)
Unlike Stump and Kretzmann’s account, which state just
one ontological dimension for the mundane events—that is,
the temporal one—Leftow provides a sort of ontological
reduplication: things exist in time and in eternity.
A first problem of such a view concerns human freedom.
If it is eternally true that Obama drinks a beer on 24th May
2032, is Obama really free of doing otherwise on that day?
We shall not seriously take into account this problem, but
we believe that Rogers gave an adequate answer to it, by
carefully distinguish between eternity and necessity
(Rogers 2007). The fact that it is eternally true that Obama
drinks a beer on 24th May 2032 does not mean that this fact
is necessary. Obama could act differently, and in that case,
it would be not eternally true that Obama has his beer at
that time, but instead the negation of that proposition
would be true. Moreover, it is necessary to distinguish
between ‘‘eternal’’ and ‘‘since always’’. From the notion of
eternity does not follow that the events are fixed ‘‘from the
beginning’’, with the consequence that it would be already
true from the beginning of time that Obama drinks a beer
on 24th May 2032. In the a-temporal dimension, that event
is so and so just because Obama chooses in that way in the
temporal dimension.8
Another problem of Leftow’s proposal seems to be more
complicated. Leftow advocates a dynamic conception of
time. This means that there is a privileged instant (the
present), that this privileged instant changes and that this
fact is a genuine ontological feature of reality. This is true
for those who accept presentism and for those who accept a
version of the moving spotlight theory: in both cases the
temporal reality is characterized by a privileged instant
with respect to the others. However, in God’s eternal
framework all the times are on a par and there is no priv-
ileged instant. By definition, there is no dynamicity. There
seems to be a feature of reality that is not grasped by God.
Notice that it is not possible to say that the dynamic status
of temporal reality is just an illusion and that only the
eternal dimension obtains. This would be in contrast with
Leftow’s proposal: it would lead us to a static conception
of temporality. The privileged instant, on the contrary, is
not an illusion and, therefore, the dynamicity is something
that essentially characterizes the temporal reality.
Often this problem is emphatically set by stating that a
timeless God cannot know what time it is. If one accepts
the idea that the dynamicity of time is an illusion, in other
terms, if one accepts a block universe, this is not a problem.
But if one is ready to say that the universe is dynamic, then
the fact that it is 4 o’ clock and not 5 o’ clock, or that now
Obama is drinking his beer, is an actual feature of the
reality which a timeless God cannot access since for Him
all times are on a par. And if there is something real which
God does not know that could represent a problem for His
omniscience. At first glance, in Leftow’s framework, there
is no way to escape this problem.
Let us briefly sum up what has been stated so far. Two
problems emerge within the tenseless conception of divine
knowledge. Firstly, if it is eternally true that an agent does
p at time t, it seems that the agent cannot do otherwise and,
then, this position would imply the theological fatalism.
Secondly, assuming a dynamic conception of time, there is
an instant, the present, which is privileged. But from the
eternal point of view of God, no time is privileged, there-
fore it seems that God does not grasp an aspect of reality.
Stump and Kretzmann’s solution from one hand and Lef-
tow’s, from the other, do not provide an adequate solution
to the second problem. We believe, however, that by
assuming a fragmentalist conception of time a solution can
be found. The next section will discuss this topic.
8 This solution has a price: it admits a grounding relation between the
free choices of a temporal entity (Obama) and an eternal state of
affairs (divine knowledge). This relation has to be a-temporal even if
it seems to be alike to a causal relation which can hardly be
considered out of time.
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5 Divine Knowledge and Fragmentalism
In the previous paragraphs we have seen that it is not easy
to characterize a timeless account of divine knowledge;
here, we will provide a tentative answer by referring—at
least partially—to Kit Fine’s account in philosophy of time
known as Fragmentalism (Fine 2005; see also Lipman
2015).9 We will proceed as follows: we will state four
general theses concerning our version of Fragmentalism
and then we will offer a timeless account of divine
knowledge.
(T1) Temporal reality is fragmented
It is important not to equivocate, here: (T1) does not
mean that there is something, i.e. the temporal reality,
whose parts are fragments of it. On the contrary, this is
exactly the thesis Fragmentalism denies: reality is origi-
nally fragmented. What exists in a proper sense, in any
instant, is a fragment. And—as we will see below—it is not
possible to coherently refer to something as ‘‘all
fragments’’.
(T2) Every fragment is constituted by tensed facts:
past, present and future facts
So, time is ‘‘real’’ since there exist genuine A-properties.
In every fragment, there exists a set of present facts, the
‘‘now’’ of the fragment. In the next fragment, part of the
future facts of the previous fragment are present facts,
present facts are past and so on.
(T3) Fragments are incompatible
This would be not surprising. Let us assume that now
Obama is standing. In another fragment, Obama is sitting;
so, the two fragments are not compatible. (Lipman 2015)
developed a logical framework in which one can handle
two types of consistency which he calls, respectively,
coherence and coherence*. The idea, in a nutshell, is the
following: he provides a semantic to a dyadic connective
‘•’ whose intended meaning is ‘‘is compatible with’’. This
allows us to say that whilst it is not logically contradictory
that Obama is sitting and Obama is standing, since there
can be two fragments in which these states of affairs
obtain, the two facts are incompatible since there is no
fragment in which both states of affairs obtain.10
(T4) Fragments are not internally complete
This is the most relevant difference with respect to
Fine’s system. To guarantee freedom in the libertarian
sense, we assume that the facts of a fragment are not a
maximal set; there are undetermined regions, i.e. those
dependent on the agent’s free decisions.
Our metaphysical framework is then—very roughly—
described by (T1–T4). How does God eternally know? The
idea is that God simultaneously sees each fragment. Let
K(g,p) be the eternal fact that God knows the proposition
p. And this holds for all true propositions, given God’s
omniscience. p is true in virtue of a truthmaker, that is, a
fact which makes it true. So, God eternally knows that
Obama drinks a beer in 2032 because Obama freely
chooses to have a beer. Today Obama has not chosen yet
and the proposition relative to this fragment is neither true
nor false: it is about a region of the future which is onto-
logically undetermined. But if Obama decides to have such
beer, then this fact is actual—in a certain fragment—and
the proposition is true relative to that fragment.
There exists no ontologically dimension beyond the
temporal one, as it happens in Leftow’s proposal. Obama
does not have a modality of eternal existence, in addition to
the temporal existence. Obama just exists in time and the
existence in time is fragmented. We said that a funda-
mental problem for the eternist accounts is to preserve the
timelessness of divine knowledge together with free acts.
These two facts seem to contradict each other: if God
eternally knows a free act F, F has to be, in a way,
determinate and then F cannot be really free. Fragmental-
ism answers to this dilemma by stating that F—as any
mundane reality—is never determinate or indeterminate
simpliciter but always with respect to a fragment. There-
fore, F is not determinate in a given fragment but it is in
another. And the reason of its determinateness is the
agent’s free action. That decision exists as a present fact
and as a past fact. But it is not necessary, since its nature is
decided by the agent.
On the proposed view, even if God is conceived as
eternal and even if the reality is dynamic, God has a full
access to the temporal reality and there is no feature of
reality He cannot know. For every fragment has a privi-
leged instant, the ‘‘now’’, and God knows which instant is
privileged in any fragment. Obviously, from an eternal
point of view, there are many ‘‘nows’’, all incompatible;
but this is not a problem for the fragmentalist since this is
her basic intuition: temporal reality is fragmented. Con-
trary to the more traditional dynamic conceptions of real-
ity, in this framework any fragment has its now; therefore,
there is no aspect of reality that God cannot know.
There are (at least) three possible objections to our
account:
9 We are not interested in a faithful construal of Fine’s position;
rather, we will exploit some intuitions of fragmentalism which we
think illuminating to solve the problem of divine timeless knowledge.
10 Lipman’s system has weird consequences: for instance, from A•B
does not follow A.
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1. A first objection is that Fragmentalism is not a real
dynamic conception of time. There is no real passage
from one fragment to another but there is just a
fragmented temporal reality which is intrinsically
static. So, the success of Fragmentalism is illusory; it
solves the problems the dynamic conceptions deal with
just because it is not a dynamic conception but an
eternalism in disguise.
One can answer to that by noting that the Fragmen-
talism’s conception of time is quite far from the block
universe view of eternalism. The tensed properties of
facts are different within the various fragments and
through these properties it is possible to reconstruct a
sort of passage of time. For instance, in fragment f1 a
fact s can hold the tensed property of being future, in
fragment f2 the property of being present and in
fragment f3 that of being past. It is therefore possible to
reconstruct the passage of time according to which s is
future, then present, then past by means of the tensed
properties of the fragments f1, f2 and f3.
2. There is no—since there cannot be—a coherent
description of God’s contents of knowledge. Let us
elaborate. The indeterminist conception we assumed
entails the following: let f1 and f2 be two fragments; let
us describe the fact that Obama drinks a beer A, and
the fact that Obama does not drink a beer :A. Let us
employ P, N, F as tensed attributes meaning respec-
tively past, present and future. Given the indetermin-
ism we have that in f1, N(:F(A)) and N(:F(:A)),
namely, today it is not a fact that in the future Obama
will drink a beer and it is not a fact that in the future
Obama will not drink a beer. Things obviously change
in f2. Obama (freely) chooses to drink a beer and then
we have N(A). But if it is currently true that N(A), then
it must be a past fact in f2 that Obama would drink a
beer, that is P(F(A)). Therefore God knows that :F(A),
that :F(:A) and that A. The ground of His knowledge
in the first two cases is the fact that Obama has not
chosen yet, while in the third case, that Obama has
chosen. Since God’s knowledge is always actual
(eternity as extended present) God sees things as
present, which are, in turn, present, past, and future. On
this account, God sees both the indeterminateness of
A and its actuality. He sees them in two different
fragments.
However, according to Fragmentalism, the various
fragments are incompatible; so, the fact that A is
indeterminate in the fragment f1 and actual in the
fragment f2 is not troublesome In a certain sense, even
our knowledge is structured in this way: we know that
yesterday it was indeterminate that Obama would drink
a beer today, but we know that it is not indeterminate
today that Obama is drinking now a beer and then that
today is determinate that it was true yesterday that
Obama would drink a beer today.
3. One could maintain that throughout the fragments
there exists a true future: there is a set of facts which,
at the end of the day, will be actual despite the
indeterminateness within a single fragment. Sure, it is
indeterminate whether today Obama will drink his beer
but Obama is going to choose something and his
choice is actual in a certain fragment. So, as in the
Ockhamist accounts, there exists ‘‘today’’ the sequence
of true future propositions: the Thin Red Line (TRL),
quoting Belnap’s expression (Belnap et al. 2001).
Here, there is a an objective tension: on one hand,
Fragmentalism is not committed to the existence of
TRL since all that exists there exists in the fragments
and, by definition, the TRL is a section of the
fragments; but on the other hand, we should concede
that God knows the TRL and then it exists—in a sense.
Our aim is not to characterize the reality sub specie
aeternitatis; rather, we would like to provide an
account of timeless divine knowledge which is com-
patible with free agents and a genuine dynamism of
time. Moreover, we think, that the existence—in a
sense—of a real future and God’s knowledge of this
future is a minimal condition not to misinterpret the
intuitive concept of omniscience which grounds the
classical theism. According to this definition, a non-
omniscient God could not be provident, with all the
consequences.
6 Conclusions
In this work, we have discussed the timeless account of
divine knowledge. Traditionally, there are good reasons to
believe that God does not exist in time and that, conse-
quently, His modality of knowledge is timeless. That is,
God does not foreknow the future but He sees any instant
as if it were present. Among the reasons to advocate this
view, it is particularly relevant the fact that it gives a
coherent account of the divine omniscience and human
freedom. However, some questions can be triggered by the
eternist solution. First of all, it is reasonable to presuppose
a God who does not exist in time only if the time is real. If
we adopt a static metaphysics of time, like, for instance, the
block-universe view, then it is not complicated to charac-
terize the relationship between the eternal God and tem-
poral reality. But it is, indeed, a cheap victory: since the
passage of time is not real, the modality of existence of
God and of the world are not so different. Much more
demanding is trying to reconcile a dynamic metaphysics of
time—where the flow of time is a genuine feature of
reality—with a timeless conception of God.
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Ironically, the most puzzling problems are the free
actions and the divine knowledge of the tensed aspects of
the world. We have seen how two important and influential
contributes (by Stump and Kretzmann, and Leftow) show,
in our opinion, some intrinsic flaws. Our proposal is to
advocate a different conception of time, that is a version of
Kit Fine’s Fragmentalism. Even if this theoretical option
has relevant theoretical costs, we believe it to be more
suitable as far as God’s eternal knowledge is concerned.
This account preserves two hardly compatible aspects: on
the one hand reality is intrinsically temporal (and for that
reason, Fine himself defined his theory as a form of non-
standard A-theory); on the other, God holds the same
relationship with all the temporal facts, that is, He sees
reality as (eternally) present. Fragmentalism does not lack
internal problems; however, we are not interested in a
defence of this particular metaphysics of time. What we
would like to argue for is that, if accepted, the Fragmen-
talism provides the best metaphysical framework to
account for a timeless view of divine knowledge.
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